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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
District Court 901400470

vs.
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant *

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF J URISDICTION
The ntah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
p u r ":iii3n>' i" i' i I

111',ih ™l 1 es of Criminal Procedure.
NATURE O F THE PRUChKDINGo

D e f e n d a n t appeals his conviction for a First D e g r e e F e l o n y ,
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STATEMENT OF TS.qTTES OK APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal of this matter is whether the
testimonies'of Terrence Bryant and Michelle Doniinge were applicable
or reliable and whether the Judge erred by not allowing the
defendant the privilege of probation. Concurrent herewith, defense
counsel has submitted a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel,
pursuant to the case of State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981)
and Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 73.6, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the issues presented in this case
are as follows:
a.

As to Point I and Point II the standard is whether there

was substantial evidence to justify the verdict returned by the
jury, and
b.

As to Point III the standard is whether the court abused

its discretion in disallowing the defendants privilege of probation
and sentencing the defendant pursuant to statute.
Defense counsel asserts that neither point can substantially
be raised as an issues in good faith and therefore resubmits a
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, pursuant to the case of
State

v.

Clavton.

639 P..2d 168

(Utah

1981) and

Anders

v.

California. 386 U.S. 736, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 13 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with the crime of Aggravated
Robbery, a'First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-302,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

On February 22, 1991, the

defendant came before the Court for sentencing. At that time, the
Court sentenced the defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term
of not less than five (5) years to life.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Smith Food King on 200 West in Prove, Utah was robbed on
November 23, 1990 at approximately 10:20 a.m. The lone bandit wore
a disguise of a wig, glasses and a heavy overcoat.

The bandit

approached the courtesy booth just inside the front door of the
store and displayed a handgun to the two clerks on duty and
demanded that the clerks put all of their money in a bag which the
bandit supplied.

The clerks complied and the bandit left through

the front door from whence he came.

A customer, Hether Kessel,

noticed a man leaving as she approached the store and witnessed the
man enter a late model red car with a white convertible top and
drive off.
After a period of some eleven (11) days without a suspect, a
tip was received from one Terrence Bryant through his parole
officer, Mr. Crawford in Salt Lake City.

He reported that an

acquaintance of his, William Joseph Smith, had committed the
robbery and had so stated to him.

With the permission of the

informant, a recording device was installed on his home telephone

3

and the authorities waited for a call from Smith. A call came and
the conversation was recorded by way of the tap.
A warrant of arrest was obtained for William Joseph Smith and
the arrest was made on November 29, 1990.

At the time of the

arrest, Smith was driving a 1979 Mercury Zepher.

At the time of

the arrest certain items were seized including certain items of
clothing and ski equipment which was in the trunk of Smith's
vehicle; a small automatic handgun which was in the trunk of the
vehicle; and a number of one dollar bills.
Following further investigation, the employees of Budget Renta-Car at the Salt Lake Airport reported that a man using the name
of William

Joseph

Smith had rented

convertible on November 15, 1990
the car on

a 1989 Chrysler LeBaron

at 10:16 p.m. and had returned

November 24, 1990 at the hour of 9:27 a.m..

At the trial of this matter, the State introduced the actual
audio recording of the telephone conversation between Terrence
Bryant and the caller who Bryant identified as Smith; testimony
from Bryant relating other incriminating statements attributed to
Smith; testimony of Pete Giles, one of the clerks at Smith's who
testified that he could positively identify the gun as that used in
the robbery and identified Smith as the robber based on his "skin
texture"; testimony of Michelle Dominge, the other clerk at Smith's
who first testified that she could not identify anyone in the
courtroom as the robber but later returned to the stand and
testified that she could identify Smith as the robber based on a
crease on his cheek which she could see when earlier leaving the
4

witness stand; the gun found in the trunk of Smith's car; the
clothes found in Smith's car; photographs of a red Chrysler LeBaron
convertible owned by Budget Rent-a-Car; testimony of the employees
of Budget Rent-a-Car who testified that a man using the name of
William Joseph Smith rented a car such as the car photographed from
November 15, 1990 to November 24, 1990 but could not say whether
the actual car rented was the one photographed nor the color of the
car actually rented; and a copy of the rental contract purportedly
signe^u. J^V siui un •
Smith called Michelle Smith, Stacy Mullens, and Shantell
Gillespie, as alibi witnesses who testified that Smith was at his
home in Murray, Utah at the time of the robbery.
Following a trial to a jury on the above facts, Smith was
convicted of Robbery, a First Degree Felony and was sentenced to
the statutory term of not less than five (5) years nor more than
life in the Utah State Prison•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts the verdict is not justified in light of the
plea of alibi and of the evidence pertaining to it and in light of
the lack of credibility of the testimony of Mr. Terrence Bryant.
Defendant further asserts that Michelle Dorainge, witness for the
State, should have not been allowed to retake the stand on the
grounds that her second testimony was an impeachment of her first
testimony. Defendant further asserts the Judge erred in sentencing
the defendant to prison and the defendant should have been allowed
the privilege of probation.
5

ARGUMENT
I.
TERRENCE 'BRYANT'S TESTIMONY IS NOT CREDIBLE, NOR RELIABLE.
Mr. Terrence Bryant is not a credible witness. His testimony
was slighted by the fact that Bryant owed the defendant a large sum
of money.

Also, Bryant had the ulterior motive of aiding his

parole officer with the taped conversation in order to stay out of
prison.

Counsel has determined that such does not rise to a

substantial issue on appeal.

Furthermore, counsel believes this

issue to be a matter of fact, not of law and therefore is an issue
to be decided by a jury in the original court, not on appeal.

In

the case of State v. Moore, 183 P.2d 937 (Utah 1947), the Utah
Supreme Court states:
That part of the argument which in substance declares that the
account related by the prosecutrix, in effect is a jury
argument, since the jurors are the sole judges of the weight
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses.
References can be found in the trial transcripts on pages 85120 of

specifically, on page 103 and page 117.
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II.
MICHELLE DOMINGE IMPEACHED HER FIRST TESTIMONY
BY BEING ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE STAND
Michelle Dominge did not identify the defendant as the armed
robber. On retaking the stand, Michelle Dominge testified that she
had identified the defendant by a crease in his cheek that she did
not notice until she had left the stand previously, and thus
impeached her first testimony.

Counsel has determined that this

does not rise to a substantial issue on appeal.

Furthermore,

counsel believes the issue is to be decided by the jury in the
original court and not on appeal. In the case of State v. Gay, 307
P. 2d 885 (Utah 1957), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Gay, it states;

In State v.

"The question of credibility of the witnesses is

for the jury.11
References

can

be

found

on

transcripts.

7

pages

79-84

of

the

trial

III.
THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO
PRISON AND DISALLOWING HIS PRIVILEGE FOR PROBATION.
The Judge had the discretion to sentence the defendant to
prison or to allow the defendant the privilege of probation.

In

the case of State v. Howellr 707 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1985), the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
The legislature has authorized trial judges to
impose
statutorily
specified
indeterminate
sentences in most cases.
Nonetheless, a trial
judge has substantial discretion in imposing
sentence. However, the exercise ot that discretion
is not unlimited, and it may not be exercised on
the basis of unreliable information.
Present counsel is unable to find any impropriety in the
sentence given by the Court.
allowed

by

statute.

It appears to be the exact sentence

Counsel

is

unaware

of

any

unreliable

information being considered by the Court in this case.
CONCLUSION
Counsel believes there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
and a Motion for Leave to Withdraw has been submitted herewith.
The Court sentenced the defendant pursuant to statute after the
defendant's conviction.

Defense counsel used every effort to

convince the Judge that the defendant should not have been sent to
prison.

Defendant is unable to point to any specific action which

could have been taken by defense counsel with a differing result.
Submitted this

^ ^

day of March, 1992.

D. v^6hn Musselman
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
8

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant, postage prepaid, this
day of March, 1992, to the following:
Paul Van Dam
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

D. Jcmn Musselman
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

EXHIBIT
Exhibit "A" - Judgement; Sentencing and Commitment
Exhibit "B" - Certification of Contact with Defendant
Exhibit "Cff - Motion for Leave to Withdraw
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76-^502

CSCilINAL CODE

7B-O-C02. Aggravated robbery,
(1) A person commita aggravated roQbery if in the course of committ:.
robpery, he:
(aj uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Sect:
75-1-601; or
(b) erases venous bodily imuiy uuon anotner.
(2) Aggravated roobery is a first degree feionv.
(3) For tne purooses of this part, an act *nn\] oe considered to be "In
course ox cominitnng a rooberr' if it occurs in an attamut to commit, dun
the commission of. or in the immediate dignt after tne attempt or commiss.
of a roobery.
HiatoTT! C 1353. To-WGZ enactea bv I1273. as. isa. 5 "s-s^nar ^975. .~~_ -n s ••
1289. ca. 170. } i.
Aacnmaens Notes. — The L9a9 ixnenament. *gecnY* ADTU - 4 . 1289. rewrote Suosec-
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- c..--™ — -M

gTT ,, ta

NOTES TO DECSIONS
sonal cronerrr --aiten is not an element at
berr, ana sroac mac *Jie gun ^»as act*-:
pomtea ana ZIZZIZLZ iae grm ai evraencs
not necessary sines d mere exciaiaon at a
ptaces ma vrcssx m. fear :T. cansncites ^ase
^Jr^a^m., In « 3 . G 3 - 537 ?^i ICCS L"
1273).
?root 3i* ail eiement3 necessarr M arcmooerr 13 aot rrwuireo: 20 tong as mere .
accamst. couniea ^ m me 'ase ai a are^
kmie. facsimile chereot. or anotner ae.
weaoon. :r me accasea causes serious cc
innirr, me elements 01 aagmvataa roooer
saasnea. State v. Gacsc ~30 ?^2i 391 1
1288): State v. Socman. 7TZ ?^i 670 ( i .

Elements at aniens*.
Eauuummt awpn?^ anavaiiaoie.
Enaence.
—Prior cormcszoiia.
—Suizcient.
SvewtTaiess mneaudcacoxi.
"yacauaiifi ot a drearm.'
Inauoea aoense.
Inaicrmeni or uuormaooiu
Intent.
Recent oo—eanoa at atoien anroerrr.
Recovenr ot
Unioaaea areann.
CItaa.
Elements ax offense.
la srosecunon ibr rcsserv »rm revolver,
basea an deienaanrs ailesea act at 'aying
monev trum anotner. wnere aeiense **as cnat.
if oefenoant irtnatiy was guucv at me ad. ae
toott aonev tinner ciaim 01 ownenniD ana .n
honest seuei that ze aaa nznt to ic as result at
cam game, >t was ernr far court za ?ive .n5tn2ccjn *neret7v ;orr vas amconrsa :o convict aetenoant nocwrcnstanain^ ansence ot felonious intent. Psooie v. Hugnes. 11 "Jtan .00.
23 ?. 492 ,1395).
Ail essential elements **re orov^a vrtere
eviaence snovmi aeienaant COOK $120 an
Mara *Q tnouzn caarzea -x\zn caxinz Sl-tO on
Marcn 3. ana wnere me victim :asti:iea me
aetenoant aaa a ^un srucx .a r-ne ^nnt ot ms
jeana out eviaence aia not anow aeienaant nanoiea jr "Domtea a ^un ana :ne gun ^as aot
touna alter tne roooerr The oate cnnrgcq neea
omv se aosetv proxnnatea. '^ie ^iue 31 per-

Entrnnment dexens« onavaiianie.
Detennant. asax^ea wttn aggraYatati roc
unoer Sunseccon \ i)(aj. was not enutiea r
deiense 01 entmoment. because '±& mr?
booiir iniurr. wruca Dreauaes antrncr
was a aecessaniv anauea element ot :r.
fense cnairea. State v Goionna. Too ? «a
(Utan .288).
Evraence.
—^asuincient.
Detenaants conviction was reversec
cause me circumstantial eviaence ^nr.e
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State / "Luisz. ~Z5 ? 2 i 50 Utaa L2Detenoanta ^lenacin^ gesture accomc
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76-6-401

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robb«ry § 3. fecnn? cnminai resuonsibiiity, 68 A.UR.4t:
C.J.S. - 77 C-LS. Rooberv § 23.
507.
AXJL — Fact that gun was unloaded as atKey Numoera. — Roobery » 11.

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of valiie. Including real estate, tangini
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals aru
birds, written instruments or other writings representing or embodyin^
nghts concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwiscontaining anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utiiir
narure sucn as teiecommumcations, gas. electncity, steam, or water, anc
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or tech
meal information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention whicr
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him
(2) "Obtain' means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer o:
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property
whether to the obtamer or another m relation to labor or services. tc
secure performance thereof: and in relation to a trade secret, to make an:
facsimile, repiica. photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive' means to have the conscious object:
(a; to withhold property permanently or for so extended a penoc
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of it^
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, wouid be lost: o:
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or othe:
compensation; or
(c; To dispose of the property under circumstances that make :
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces
saniy limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-la^
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception'' occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conauct an impression of law o
fact that is faise ana chat the actor does not believe to be true an
that is likley to affect the judgment of another m the transaction: o
(b) Fails to correct a faise lmDression of law or fact that the actc
previously created or coniirmed by woras or conduct that is likely t
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now be
lieve to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect hi
judgment m the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without dii
closing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impec160
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(f) an order of the court granting a morion to withdraw a plea of .
or no contest.
(4) (a) All appeals in cnminai cases shall be taken within 30 days aitentry of the judgment appealed from* or, if a motion for a new rearrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving
shall be filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material der
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeai. or upon motion of the
lant. The dismissal of the appeai affirms the judgment uniess ar
appeai may be, and is. timeiy taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond sh
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on bnexs. If an appellant's brief is ait
acnsai .shall be decided 9v*n though a Dairy, noon notice of the hssmir
to appear for orai argument.
(T) The rules of civii procedure relating to appeals govern criminal a
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided.
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the se
of death has been imposed, appellant brieis shall be filed within c
of the filing of the record on appeai. Respondent brieis snail b
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be rai
appeal snail be included by each party in its appellate brief. Apr
reply brieis snail be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respor
brief.
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be gnu
each party, but oniy upon application to the Supreme Court sr
extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension.
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the orai arguments of the
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the finn
Following orai arguments, the case snail be piaced first on the Si
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination.
(9) After an initial appeai has been resolved, a subsequent appe
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be
tamed by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be z
when the appeai dees not raise any hew matter not previously resc
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeai.
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeai. the case snail be autoirreviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification
sentencing court of the entire record, uniess the time is extendec
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of de
• 'priority over ail other cases in setting for hearing and in dispositior
Supreme Court.
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit cour
by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court reiati::
peais from circuit courts govern cnminai as weil as civil appeals.
(12) An appeai may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of
as is appropriate, from ail finai orders and judgments rendered in ~
court or juvenile court under ring rule.
404

Rule 28

UTAH RULES OF CUtMINAL PROCEDURE

State had right of appeal from judgment dis- postuidgment rH *rm mm | A of vacation** State
charging defendant, in prosecution for felony, Amaoor, 150 Utan Adv. Rep. XI iCL Ac
on ground that information did not state facts 1990),
In a tnai for possession of a controlled 3u
suiSaent to constitute public offense. State v.
stance where, alter ail the evidence *** m a:
McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 ?. 315 (1902).
lta
c
The state had no right to appeal sentence both sides presented ciosmg argunn»« » ^h*
imposed upon defendant sine* the imposition of fenoant renewed his motion to auuprese esentence was part of the judgment, and not an dence, which was granted, the onto? aopeai
order made after judgment. State v. Keibach. from was an acquittal and not a "Mianusaai'
that term is used in Suodinsion iJJHai ot ::
569 ?£& 1100 (Utah 1977).
This auction does not authorize the prosecu- ruie. .ind was not subject to aopeai bv the sta.
tion to appeal an acquittal, no matter how State v. Willard. 301 P.2d 189 lUUn CL A.
overwhelming the evidence against the defen- 1990).
dant may be. State v. Musseiman, 667 P.2d Applicability of civil rules.
1061 (Utah 1983).
Where dinTuionai of charge was based on trial —Court findings.
Ruie 52(a). U.R.C.P. (effect of court findir.
court's construction of the applicable law before the couzt ruled on the sufficiency of the applies in cnminai cases by virtue ox SUDCL:
evidence to convict, the ruiing was. in effect, a sion 17) of this rule. State v. Waik«f% "43 P
"Snai judgment of dismissal" under Subdivi- 191 (Utah 1987\
Ruie 52. UJIC-P. (findings by th» court;
sion (3)(a> and therefore was appeaiaoie even
though the ruling was made at the close of all piies to cnminai actions. State v. Goooir.
the evidence. State v. Musseiman. 667 ?.2d 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).
1061 (Utan 1983).
Attorneys failure to file notice
The state may not. following a pretrial rulWhere if. within the statutory p*nod for
ing suppressing some state s evidence, request peai. defendant has requested counsel to z.
dismissal of a criminal case in order to avoid an appeal and counsel gave defendant rea
the discretionary appeal provisions of Subdivi- to believe that he would but then lauea zz
sion (3)(e) and to obtain an appeal of right un- 30. the remeay to estaolish the denial ot
der Subdivision i3)(ai. State v. Waddouos. 712 nght to appeai is not in the Supreme ^ o u ^
P.2d 223 (Utah 1985).
by a motion for reiief under Ruie^ 55^
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the U.H.C.P. in the sentencing court. State
ground that the prosecution has not proved an Johnson. 635 ?.2d 36 (Utan 1981*. ^
element of the offense beyond a reasonaoie
If it is found upon a hearing that a aeienc
doubt is in suostance an acquittal and '-Here- was induced, by reason of his attorney s re
fore is not aopeaiabie. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d sentanon that an appeal wouid be pertectec
1279 (Utah 1988).
ailow his time to take an appeai to expixr
State could not appeal an order granting de- that he was misied as to his ngnt to aopeai.
fendant a new trial after he moved to arrest defendant shouid be resentancea nunc pro
judgment or. in the alternative, for a new oial upon previous finding of guiit so ss to ai
where the trial court did not. in substance, Viim an opportunity of prosecuting *od Per
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial. ing an appeai. 3ince the ame for siting
State v. Owens. 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct Aop. appeal wouid date arcm the rendition oi
1988).
new judgment. State v. Johnson. cv>5 * .—
An appeal from the denial of a motion for (Utah 1981).
new tnai is not an appeal by the state permitted by Subdivision (3). because the state s ap- Bind over orders.
peal is not an appealfroma 'finai judgment of
Suodivision i2)(c) governs ail acpeais
dismissal." An appeal by the state prooeny lies bind over oraers entered in anv court, ate
only nrom the oraer of dismissal and does not Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264 (Utan LSSo*.
Defendant, a juvemie wnose preiimmar
lie from the denial of a motion for new tnai.
State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. ADD. amination was conducted in aissnct
rather than m circuit court, was noc cenie
1989).
nght to review of the bind over oraer oy
—Dismissals.
penor court, since he had the same rsst
The language ''a final judgment of dismissal" Subdivision (2)lc) to see* review as^aoer
in Subdivision i3)(a> refers to dismissals wnere other cnminai defendant. State v. ^enr*
the tnai court construes the appucaoie iaw be- 712 P.2d 264 ^Utan 19851.
fore ruiing an the sufficiency of the evidence co
. .
convict ana before a anal judgment:. State 7. Deach penalty cases,
Whiie Utan iaw does not compel *L=eie
Amador. 150 Utah Adv. Reo. 23 (CL Aop.
sentenced to death co go chrougn e**7
1990).
Subdivision (3) precludes appeals from dure that a deiendant mignt voinnart-
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Exhibit "A"

IH THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
k'krk'k-k'kvc-x-x'k-x-k'k'k-^

MINUTE EHTRY

STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER

Plaintiff,

901400470

-vs-

DATE

WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH,

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

Defendant.

FE3RUARY 2 2 ,

1991

R e t t : Vonda B a s s e " , CSR
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND C0MMITME1

T h i s m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e Court f o r s e n t e n c i n g .

Ccur/

A r t o r n e v C a r l y l e K. Bryson a p p e a r i n g in b e h a l f of t h e S t a t s
Utah.

of

D e f e n d a n t a p p e a r i n g by and t h r o u g h John Mussalman.
Mr. Musselman a d d r e s s e d t h e Court i n d e f e n d a n t ' s

The S t a t e

behalf

responded.
D e f e n d a n t , having p l e a d g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e

A c c r a v a t a d Robbery, a F i r s t Decree

r

elonv

of

b e i n g new p r e s e n t

in

c o u r t and r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , and t h e r e b e i n g no l e g a l

reasc

why s e n t e n c e s h o u l d not be imposed, i s h e r e s y s e n t e n c e d a s

folic

SENTENCE
The d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o be c o n f i n e d i n t n e U t a h
S t a t e P r i s o n f o r a term not l e s s t h a n f i v e

(5) y e a r s t o

life.

CUSTODY REMAND
The d e f e n d a n t i s remanded t o t h e c u s t o d y of t h e U t a n
County Sheriff

t o be t r a n s p o r t e d by him t o t n e Warden of t n e Ut:

S t a t e P r i s o n i n e x e c u t i o n of t h i s s e n t e n c e -

Exhibit "B"

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) for:
ELKINS, MUSSELMAN & MADSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Ut&lT 84601
Telephone 374^1212
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH ,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Utah Supreme Court
910350
District Court
901400470

vs.
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH
Defendant/Appellant*

D. John Musselman, attorney of record for William Joseph
Smith, hereby certifies to the Court that the defendant/appellant
has been sent a copy of the pending Ander's Brief filed on his
behalf and has been given leave to present additional points he
feels pertinent to the appeal.
The Defendant was notified and sent a copy of the appeal on
March 6, 1992.
DATED this

/%

day of March, 1992.

D 7 ft>HN MUSSELMAN

Attorney for Defendant

Exhibit "C"

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) for:
ELKINS, MUSSELMAN & MADSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
40 South 1Q0 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah'84601
Telephone 374-1212
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF OTAH
STATE OF UTAH

: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW
: AS COUNSEL

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
: Utah Supreme Court
910350
: District Court
901400470
:

WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH
Defendant/Appellant.

:

D. John Musselman, attorney of record for William Joseph
Smith, hereby moves the Court for leave to withdraw as counsel in
the above-entitled case.
This Motion is based upon the grounds that defense counsel can
find no meritorious issues on appeal and cannot in good faith bring
forth an appeal in the behalf of the defendant.

Counsel is now

withdrawing because there are no further alternatives that can in
good faith be brought to the court.
WHEREFORE, counsel respectfully moves the Court for leave
to withdraw as counsel for defendant in this matter.
DATED this

/ft*

day of March, 1992.

D. J0HN MUSSELMAN
Attorney for Defendant

